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1. Introduction. 
Germany is well to the fore in terms of collective bargaining 
decentralisation in Europe (Keune 2011). In the international literature it 
is often regarded as a standard case of ‘organised’ or ‘controlled 
decentralisation’, within the framework of which the bargaining parties at 
sectoral level define the scope for derogations at company level via so-
called opening clauses (Visser 2016; OECD 2017). In many European 
countries German experiences have served as an important reference point 
for reform of national collective bargaining systems. 
The international perception of the German variant of decentralisation, 
however, is often rather one-sided and does not reflect German collective 
bargaining in all its diversity. There are at least two fundamental problems. 
First, its development is very much viewed through the lenses of major 
manufacturing industries, such as chemicals or metalworking, which 
industrial relations regimes differ very much from those in other sectors, 
such as private services (Dribbusch et al. 2017). In addition to a general 
overview of German collective bargaining and its decentralising tendencies, 
in this chapter we provide two in-depth case studies – one on the metal 
industry and one on retail trade – which provides a comprehensive picture 
of the differentiated world of collective bargaining in Germany. 
Secondly, the concept of ‘organised decentralisation’ often takes too 
rosy a view and underestimates the level of conflict. As German 
experiences show clearly, collective bargaining decentralisation is not 
about a more or less ‘intelligent’ mode of regulation, but about different 
interests and power relations. It deals with the fundamental conflict 
between setting up a level playing-field for all companies and recognising 
the specific interests and circumstances of individual firms. 
The trend towards decentralisation has fundamentally changed the 
German collective bargaining system. Organised and non-organised forms 
of decentralisation exist side by side, together with an overall trend toward 
the erosion of collective bargaining in some parts of the economy. While 
decentralisation often goes together with a shift in power from labour to 
capital, it sometimes creates new opportunities for revitalising union 
power. 
2. Decentralisation of German collective bargaining – an 
overview. 
2.1 Basic features of German collective bargaining. 
The legal basis of collective bargaining in Germany is provided by the 
Collective Agreements Act of 1949 (Tarifvertragsgesetz) (Däubler 2016). 
Collective agreements can be concluded between employers’ associations 
(or individual employers), on one hand, and trade unions, on the other. In 
contrast, works councils – the statutory employee representation bodies 
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elected at workplace and company level – may conclude only works 
agreements (Betriebsvereinbarung), but not collective agreements. 
According to the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) 
works agreements ‘may not deal with remuneration and other conditions 
of employment that have been fixed, or are normally fixed, by collective 
agreement’ (Article 77, para 3). Germany has a so-called dual system of 
interest representation in terms of which unions conclude collective 
agreements, while works councils, as non-union bodies, have to regulate 
and monitor their implementation at company level. 
Collective agreements are directly binding for all members of the 
bargaining parties concerned; that is, for employees who are members of 
the signatory unions and all member companies of the signatory 
employers' associations, or a single company in the case of a company 
agreement. In practice, employers bound by a collective agreement usually 
apply the agreed provisions to all employees, regardless of whether they 
are trade union members or not. Collective agreements can also be 
extended by the Minister of Labour to include those employers and 
employees in the relevant sector who are not directly bound by the 
agreement. In practice, however, the extension of collective agreements is 
very rare and takes place only in a limited number of sectors (Schulten et 
al. 2015). 
According to the ‘favourability principle’ (Günstigkeitsprinzip), 
departures from collectively-agreed provisions are usually possible only 
when these favour employees. For example, a works agreement can 
provide better employment conditions than a collective agreement, but 
may not worsen them. However, the bargaining parties may agree on so-
called ‘opening clauses’ (Öffnungsklauseln) in collective agreements that 
allow, under certain conditions, a derogation from collectively agreed 
standards, even if this changes employment conditions for the worse. 
There are two basic types of collective agreements in Germany: 
association-level or sectoral agreements (Verbands- or 
Branchentarifverträge) and company agreements (Firmentarifverträge) for 
individual companies or establishments. By the end of 2016, the German 
Ministry of Labour had officially registered 73,436 valid collective 
agreements, of which 30,463 were concluded at sectoral and 42,973 at 
company level (WSI 2017).  
2.2 German collective bargaining: structure and trends. 
Traditionally, the German model of collective bargaining was 
associated with a comprehensive system of sectoral agreements and a high 
bargaining coverage. Since the mid-1990s, however, it has undergone a 
series of profound changes that have led to an increasing fragmentation 
and partial erosion of the system (Schulten and Bispinck 2015; Addison et 
al. 2017). Based on the data provided by the annual IAB Establishment 
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Panel, which is carried out by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) 
of the German Federal Employment Agency, between 1998 and 2016 the 
proportion of workers covered by collective agreements in western 
Germany decreased from 76 to 59 per cent, while in eastern Germany the 
proportion fell from 63 to 47 per cent (Figure 1.1). The partial erosion of 
collective bargaining is even more pronounced with regard to sectoral 
agreements, the traditional core of the German bargaining model. 
According to IAB data the percentage of workers covered by sectoral 
agreements decreased from 68 to 51 per cent in western Germany and 
from 52 to 36 per cent in the east of the country. 
 
 
Figure 1 Collective bargaining coverage in Germany, 1998–2016 (workers covered by 
collective agreements as a percentage of all workers) 
 
 
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017). 
 
 
Among the 56 per cent of German workers who still had a collective 
agreement in 2016, 48 per cent were covered by a sectoral and 8 per cent 
by a company agreement (Figure 2). For about half of the 44 per cent of 
workers who are not covered by collective agreements, the companies 
claim that they take prevailing sectoral agreements as ‘orientation’ for their 
own in-house determination of wages and working conditions. The 
substance of the collective agreements is thus beyond the scope of formal 
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bargaining coverage. As some recent studies have found, however, many 
companies that take their bearings from prevailing sectoral agreements, 
often provide for wages and conditions well below collectively agreed 
standards (Addison et al. 2016; Berwing 2016).  
In general, larger companies are much more likely to be covered by 
collective agreements, while the majority of smaller companies have no 
agreement at all. Thus, the bargaining coverage of companies is rather low 
(Figure 2). In 2016, only 27 per cent of companies were covered by a 
sectoral agreement, 2 per cent had a company agreement, while the 
majority – 70 per cent – of all companies were not covered by collective 
agreements (among them 42 per cent that claim to take prevailing sectoral 
agreements as orientation). 
 
 
Figure 2: Collective bargaining coverage in Germany as a percentage of establishments and 
employees, 2016 
 
Establishments    Employees 
 
        
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
 
Correct figure text 
 
The IAB establishment panel has been the standard source for 
calculating collective bargaining coverage in Germany for years. More 
recently, the German Statistical Office has published an alternative 
calculation, based on the German Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). 
According to the latter, overall bargaining coverage is not 56 per cent of 
VARIETIES OF DECENTRALISATION IN GERMAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING – EXPERIENCES FROM 
METAL INDUSTRY AND RETAIL TRADE 
7 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 137/2017 
 
employees (as calculated by the IAB), but only 45 per cent (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2016a).1  
The advantage of the SES data is that they provide more detailed 
information on collective bargaining coverage in different sectors (Figure 
3). In some branches, such as public administration, financial services or 
energy, the vast majority of workers – 80 per cent or more – are still 
covered by collective agreements. The same holds true for some core 
manufacturing industries, such as the automobile or chemical industries, 
in which around two-thirds of workers are still covered by collective 
agreements. Sectors such as construction, postal services and health and 
social services show a bargaining coverage of around 40 per cent. Finally, 
in a large number of private service sectors, such as retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants, automobiles or IT services, only a minority – less than 30 
per cent – of workers are covered by collective agreements. 
 
 
Figure 3 Collective bargaining coverage in selected sectors, 2014 (workers covered by 
collective agreements as a percentage of of all workers) 
 
 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016) using data of the German Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES). 
                                                             
1 There is no satisfying explanation for the difference so far. Both the IAB and the SES data 
are representative for all groups and sizes of companies. From conversations with the data 
providers it emerges that, due to differences in the methodology of the surveys, IAB data 
might slightly overestimate and the SES data slightly underestimate bargaining coverage, so 
that the real figure might be somewhere in the middle. 
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Finally, there is a close relationship between collective bargaining 
coverage and wage levels. Compared with other European countries, 
Germany exhibits a rather unusual pattern, whereby bargaining coverage 
increases with wage level. According to SES data, workers in the two lowest 
wage quintiles have a bargaining coverage of only 27 per cent. In contrast, 
66 per cent of workers in the highest wage quintile are covered by a 
collective agreement (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2017: 
74). This shows that the decline of German collective bargaining has been 
particularly marked in the low-wage sector, in which only a minority of 
workers are still protected by collective agreements. Studies have also 
identified the decline in bargaining coverage as the single most important 
reason for the growing wage inequality in Germany (Felbermayr et al. 
2015). 
2.3 Decentralisation of collective bargaining. 
The German system of collective bargaining has always been 
characterised by a highly differentiated interplay between sector- and 
company-level regulations. Trade unions and employers’ associations 
agree on certain minimum conditions at sectoral level in order to limit 
competition on labour costs and to demarcate a level-playing field. 
Management and works councils implement agreements at company level 
and typically negotiate additional social benefits. Apart from a relatively 
clear division of labour between the two bargaining areas, there were 
always some overlaps as the sectoral agreements include some opening 
clauses which allow room for regulation at company level. This started as 
early as the 1960s and 1970s with opening clauses on work organisation 
and additional payments and continued in the 1980s with opening clauses 
on working time, which were agreed in exchange for working time 
reductions.  
The major push for the decentralisation of German collective 
bargaining came in the 1990s, against the background of a deep economic 
crisis in the aftermath of German unification. A growing number of 
employers started to criticise the system of sectoral collective agreements 
for being ’too rigid’ and for not providing sufficient ‘flexibility at the 
company level’. Originally, the demands for derogations from sectoral 
agreements came particularly from companies in severe economic 
difficulties. In a context of increasing unemployment in Germany, sectoral 
agreements from the mid-1990s increasingly included ’hardship clauses’ 
whereby companies obtained the right to derogate from sectoral standards 
in exchange for the safeguarding of jobs. At first, such deviations were 
possible only under relatively strict conditions. However, over time the 
criteria for opening clauses were no longer restricted to the danger of 
bankruptcy but were widened to embrace all kinds of situations and 
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motivations, including even ‘improving competitiveness’ (Bispinck and 
Schulten 2010). 
Demands for the decentralisation of collective bargaining came first of 
all from the employers, with considerable support from mainstream 
economics (for example, Ochel 2005). There was also a strong push for 
decentralisation from political parties, which sometimes called for a 
statutory opening clause or a revision of the favourability principle 
(Bispinck and Schulten 2005).  
Among the German trade unions the issue of decentralisation was 
much more contested (Bispinck 2004a; Bahnmüller 2017). The Chemical 
Workers Union (IG BCE), for example, has taken a more proactive stance 
took since the early 1990s and has agreed on some major opening clauses 
regarding wages, annual bonuses and working time. In this way, IG BCE 
was able to establish a system of controlled decentralisation whereby the 
union and not parties at the company have the final say on derogations. In 
the view of IG BCE this approach has helped the union to stabilise the 
entire bargaining system in the chemical sector (Erhard 2007; Förster 
2008). In contrast, most other unions originally took a much more sceptical 
view and tried, if not to prevent at least to limit the spread of opening 
clauses, which were widely regarded as a fundamental threat to the 
concept of sectoral bargaining.  
In practice, however, all unions were more or less ready to accept 
company deals with deviations from sectoral agreements, especially when 
the companies threaten the loss of employment. The debates with the 
unions came to a turning point in 2004 when the Metalworkers Union IG 
Metall concluded the Pforzheim Agreement, which includes a general 
opening clause and some procedural rules for controlled decentralisation.2 
After this milestone agreement, similar opening clauses have been 
concluded in almost all major sectors (Bispinck and Schulten 2010). As a 
result, the use of opening clauses for derogations at company level became 
a new norm in German collective bargaining. 
2.4 The use of opening clauses in practice. 
There are only a few studies and data sets with empirical information 
on the spread of opening clauses in German collective bargaining (Bispinck 
and Schulten 2003, 2010; Brändle and Heimbach 2013; Ellguth and Kohaut 
2010, 2014; Amlinger and Bispinck 2016). One dataset with information 
on the use of opening clauses is the IAB Establishment Panel, which 
provides data for 2005, 2007 and 2011 (Ellguth and Kohaut 2014: 441). 
According to the IAB data, in 2011 20 per cent of all establishments 
covered by collective agreements, representing about 35 per cent of all 
workers, made use of some kind of opening clauses; 13 per cent used 
opening clauses regarding working time; and 10 per cent on pay issues 
                                                             
2 On the Pforzheim Agreement see the section on the metal industry.  
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(ibid.: 442). Usually, larger establishments use opening clauses more 
frequently than smaller establishments. There is no clear relationship 
between a company’s resort to opening clauses and its economic 
performance; it is not limited to establishments in economic trouble (ibid.: 
447). 
Another data source with information on the use of opening clauses is 
the WSI Works Council Survey, which is a representative survey of 
establishments with at least 20 employees and a works council (Amlinger 
and Bispinck 2016).3 The results from the WSI Survey are similar to those 
from the IAB data. All in all, in 2015 21 per cent of all establishments were 
covered by collective agreements that made use of opening clauses. In 
larger establishments the frequency is somewhat higher than in smaller 
ones. There is no clear relationship to economic performance, as opening 
clauses were used by 24 per cent of establishments with ‘bad’ economic 
performance and by 20 per cent of those whose economic performance 
was ‘good’ (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 Derogations from collective agreements at company level, with or without opening 
clauses, 2015 (as a percentage of all companies covered by a collective agreement) 
 
 
 
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016). 
                                                             
3 Because of changes in the questionnaire the data are not fully comparable with earlier 
versions of the WSI Survey. For an evaluation of the earlier version see: Bispinck and Schulten 
2003, 2010. 
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The WSI Survey also contains information on companies that derogate 
from collective agreements without the justification of an opening clause 
(Figure 4). In total, 13 per cent of all establishments declared that they 
practice some form of ‘informal decentralisation’. This probably marks the 
lower extreme due to a number of undetected cases. Again such 
establishments might be characterised by poor or good economic 
performance. The frequency of informal derogations increases with size of 
establishment, with the exception of very large companies (more than 
1,000 employees), at which the frequency is somewhat lower. 
In terms of sectors, the use of opening clauses is most widespread in 
manufacturing (28 per cent), transport and hotels and restaurants (23 per 
cent), investment goods and company-related services (both 21 per cent). 
Use is very much below average in construction and financial services 
(Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 Use opening-clauses in various sectors, 2015 (percentage of all companies covered 
by collective agreements) 
 
 
 
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016). 
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In terms of topics the opening clauses used most often concern 
working time, including provisions for reduction or extension of working 
time or for flexible working time arrangements. Of equal importance are 
opening clauses on wages, allowances and annual bonuses. Opening 
clauses are used relatively rarely with regard to apprenticeship pay or other 
issues (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6 Topics of used opening-clauses, 2015 (percentage of all companies covered by 
collective agreements) 
 
 
 
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016). 
 
 
2.5 Procedural rules on opening clauses. 
There are some significant differences regarding procedural rules for 
opening clauses. The standard form, which was developed in the first half 
of the 1990s in the chemical industry (Erhard 2007), follows the following 
procedure. First, the union and employer association agree to introduce an 
opening clause, its content and concrete conditions and procedure for its 
adoption. The content can be conclusive or it can define scope for 
derogation at company level. Usually, the parties at company level – 
management and work council – have to make a joint application to the 
sectoral bargaining parties, which make the final decision on the 
derogation. The basic idea underlying ‘controlled decentralisation’ is that 
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companies cannot opt for derogation as they see fit. However, sometimes 
the sectoral parties also delegate competence for the final decision to the 
parties at company level. This is the case in particular when the issue is of 
minor importance. 
Since the adoption of the Pforzheim Agreement in the German metal 
industry in 2004 many sectors have agreed on general opening clauses, 
which mainly define procedural rules but say nothing about the content of 
derogation. The latter is usually the result of bargaining between the union 
and the company with the participation of all actors at both sectoral and 
company level. Concrete derogations are often laid down in a company 
agreement. There are some further procedural rules which usually need to 
be recognised when using opening clauses: 
– companies have to open their books to justify the need of derogations;  
– derogations have to be terminated after a certain period of time;  
– companies have to offer something in exchange for derogations (usually 
job security or new investment). 
Finally, most trade unions also have internal coordination rules to 
control the use of opening clauses. Usually, every derogation has to be 
approved by a central coordination body, which has to check whether it is 
in line with the trade union’s rules and principles and whether it has no 
negative consequences for other companies (for example, for the case of 
the Unified Services Union ver.di: Wiedemuth 2006). 
3. Decentralisation of collective bargaining – the 
German metal industry. 
3.1 Employment in the German metal industry – a sectoral profile. 
The metal industry is Germany’s key industrial sector with an annual 
turnover of more than one trillion euros. The sector comprises more than 
24,000 companies with almost 3.9 million employees (Gesamtmetall 2016: 
2). The largest sub-sectors within the metal industry are the machine-
building industry, the automobile industry, production of metal goods and 
the electro and electronic industry (Figure 7).  
 
 
  
14 THORSTEN SCHULTEN - REINHARD BISPINCK 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 137/2017 
Figure 7 Number of workers in the German metal industry, 2016  
 
 
 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
The German metal industry is heavily dependent on foreign markets 
as two-thirds of products and services are exported. Although there are a 
few large, well-known corporations, such as Volkswagen, Siemens, Bosch, 
Daimler and BMW, the industry is dominated by small and medium-sized 
enterprises (the famous Mittelstand). More than two-thirds of all 
metalworking companies have fewer than 100 employees, while only 2 per 
cent have a workforce of more than 1,000.  
Regarding employment structure, metalworking is first of all a male-
dominated sector: nearly 80 per cent of all metalworkers are men. In 
contrast to many other sectors the vast majority – 88 per cent – of 
employees work full-time, while only 12 per cent have a part-time or 
marginal part-time job (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8 Structure of employment in the German metal industry, September 2016 
(percentage of all metalworkers) 
 
  
 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
3.2 Trade unions and employers’ associations in the German metal 
industry. 
The two main collective actors in the metal industry are the German 
Metalworkers Union, IG Metall, and the Federation of German Employers' 
Associations in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries, 
Gesamtmetall. IG Metall is the largest affiliate of the Confederation of 
German Trade Unions (DGB), with about 2.27 million members in 2016. 
Apart from the metal industry, IG Metall also represents some other 
sectors, such as the metal trade, the steel industry, the wood industry and 
the textile industry. 
After its membership had peaked in 1991 due to German unification, 
IG Metall was faced by a severe decline, which was largely the result of 
strong deindustrialisation in eastern Germany and continuous job losses in 
the west (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011, Figure 9). After 2005, the 
metalworkers’ union intensified its organising policy in order to turn the 
tide. In conjunction with a reviving economy the union had finally managed 
to slow down the decline before it was hit by the crisis of 2008/2009. After 
the crisis IG Metall was even able to realise a moderate increase in 
membership, but the absolute figures remain below the pre-unification 
level. 
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Figure 9 Membership of IG Metall, 1980–2016 (millions; until 1990: West Germany, from 
1991: Germany) 
 
 
 
 
Source: IG Metall. 
 
 
About 30 per cent of the union’s members are either unemployed or 
have retired. Almost 90 per cent of the active membership works in the 
metal industry. The union’s main stronghold is the automobile industry, in 
which around 70 per cent of the employees are union members. At some 
car manufacturing plants union density remains at 90 per cent or even 
higher. Along the supply chain of the automobile industry, however, union 
density is weaker, with slightly more than 40 per cent of the employees 
being organised. Less organised are, for example, the electronic and IT 
industries, in which less than 30 per cent of employees hold a union 
membership card. 
IG Metall’s institutional strength at workplace level is also closely 
related to the existence of works councils. According to the representative 
Establishment Survey of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), in 
Germany works councils exist only in 9 per cent of all establishments, 
representing 41 per cent of all employees. Their existence depends 
primarily on company size: in establishments with more than 500 
employees about 90 per cent have a works council (Ellguth and Kohaut 
2017). In 2014 about 71 per cent of all works council members within the 
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organisational domain of IG Metall were members of the union, some 28 
per cent were unorganised and a marginal 0.3 per cent were members of 
the small Christian Metal Workers’ Union or CGM (Christliche Gewerkschaft 
Metall). In larger companies with 500 or more employees 80 per cent or 
more of the works councillors are members of IG Metall.  
The employers’ association in the metal industry, Gesamtmetall, is the 
largest federation in the Confederation of German Employers' Associations 
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA), which is 
the peak organisation on the employers’ side. Gesamtmetall is an umbrella 
organisation of a large number of regional employers’ associations in the 
German metal industry. These regional associations are the bargaining 
partners of regional sections of IG Metall when it comes to negotiations on 
industry-wide collective agreements. Traditionally, all companies that are 
member of the employers’ association were automatically covered by the 
sectoral collective agreement. Since the 1990s, however, many employers’ 
associations have introduced a special membership status, known as 'OT 
status' (OT = ohne Tarifbinding; ‘not covered by the collective agreement’), 
which provides member companies with the association’s full range of 
services, but relieves them of the duty to comply with the standards set by 
the industry-wide collective agreement. Gesamtmetall was initially against 
this type of membership but finally accepted it in 2005, acknowledging 
associations with ‘OT’ status as affiliates. Some companies take advantage 
of this special OT status but negotiate company-level agreements, often 
with the support of their employers’ association. Others have withdrawn 
from collective bargaining, while some still take the sectoral collective 
agreements as orientation. 
The number of member companies in Gesamtmetall with OT status has 
shown a continuous increase. About half of all member companies, 
representing about 20 per cent of the affected workers, now have OT status 
and thus are not obliged to accept the sectoral collective agreement in 
metalworking. In particular, small and medium-sized companies have used 
this status to withdraw from collective bargaining. 
3.3 Collective bargaining in the German metal industry; structure 
and trends. 
The dominant pattern of collective bargaining in German metalworking 
is sectoral bargaining. The metal industry is historically subdivided into 21 
regional bargaining areas, in which the relevant employers’ associations 
negotiate with the regional IG Metall organisations (IG Metall 2017: 12). 
The most prominent bargaining areas are in the federal states of Baden-
Wuerttemberg and North-Rhine Westphalia, where the bulk of 
metalworking industry is concentrated. Collective bargaining in 
metalworking usually takes the form of pattern bargaining, whereby a pilot 
agreement is concluded in one bargaining area and then transferred – 
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sometimes with some specific regional amendments – to the other 
bargaining areas. The sectoral collective agreements cover the whole range 
of sub-branches within the metal industry, including the automotive 
industry, machine-building and the electro and electronic industries. Only 
the iron- and steel industry, as well as the various metal trades have 
separate collective agreements. 
The long-term development of collective bargaining coverage in the 
metal industry is difficult to describe as there are no consistent data series. 
Studies on bargaining coverage in Germany usually rely on data from the 
IAB Establishment Panel, which is a representative employer survey 
covering all branches and all sizes of company. The IAB Establishment 
Panel, however, does not provide figures for the metal industry but only 
for the whole manufacturing sector (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017). As a rough 
approximation to the metal industry figures are available for the sector 
‘capital goods and durable consumer goods’, which covers most 
metalworking branches. On this basis, the figures indicate a relatively 
stable bargaining coverage of about 60 per cent during the past 8 years, 
which is only slightly above the national average (Table 2.1). 
 
 
Table 1 Collective bargaining coverage in industries producing capital and durable consumer 
goods, 2009–2016 (% of all employees or establishments) 
      
 2009 2011 2013 2015 2016 
Employees 61 58 62 60 60 
Establishments 32 24 22 26 21 
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, special evaluation by the IAB for the authors. 
 
 
Another source for measuring bargaining coverage is the German 
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), which provides more detailed 
information but only for 2014 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). According 
to this, bargaining coverage of employees within the different sub-sectors 
of the German metal industry varies between 36 per cent in the production 
of metal goods and 75 per cent in the shipbuilding and aviation industry 
(Figure 5). In the automobile and machine-building industry coverage is 
69 and 67 per cent, respectively. As bargaining coverage depends very 
much on the size of the company it is much lower in establishments, 
varying between only 5 per cent in metal goods and 18 per cent in the 
shipbuilding and aviation industry. 
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Figure 11 Collective bargaining coverage in sub-sectors of the German metal industry, 2014 
(% of employees or establishments) 
 
 
 
Source: German Structure of Earnings Survey (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016a). 
 
 
A third source for calculating collective bargaining coverage in the 
metal industry is the membership data of the employers’ association 
Gesamtmetall, which goes back to 1960. According to these figures, 
sectoral agreements in metalworking have undergone a remarkable decline 
(Figure 11). While in 1960 about 80 per cent of all metalworkers in western 
Germany were covered by sectoral agreements, that had fallen to just over 
50 per cent by 2015. The decline started in the 1980s and accelerated in 
the 1990s. It slowed only at the end of 2000s. Since then it has remained 
relatively stable at a low level. In eastern Germany the situation is even 
more dramatic. After a sharp decline in bargaining coverage in the 1990s, 
only around 17 per cent of eastern German metalworkers are still covered 
by a collective agreement.  
Turning to establishments, the figures are even more striking: only 17 
per cent of western German and 5 per cent of eastern German 
metalworking companies are still covered by sectoral agreements. 
Although some establishments are covered by company agreements, the 
large majority of (mainly small-sized) companies in metalworking are not 
affected by collective bargaining. 
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Figure 12 Collective bargaining coverage by sectoral agreements in the German metal 
industry, 1960–2015 (% of all employees or establishments) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gesamtmetall, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
3.4 Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry. 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry has 
a long history. Under the conditions of full employment in the 1960s, the 
trade unions demanded additional company bargaining (betriebsnahe 
Tarifpolitik) in order to obtain extra payments at company level and to 
regulate them within company agreements. At that time, the employers 
emphasised the value of sectoral agreements, which were seen as an 
important instrument for moderating wage increases. The picture changed 
with growing mass unemployment in the 1980s, when the employers 
started to demand more flexibility and (downward) derogations from 
sectoral agreements at company level. 
The introduction and specific design of opening clauses as a form of 
‘organised decentralisation’ has always been an issue giving rise to harsh 
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conflicts and was sometimes even accompanied by industrial action. For a 
long time, IG Metall was very sceptical about using opening clauses, which 
were criticised for undermining the principal function of sectoral 
agreements, namely the determination of agreed standards for the whole 
sector and therewith the limitation of competition on wages and other 
labour costs (Bahnmüller 2017). In practice, however, the union was 
always open to negotiating special conditions for companies that were in 
real economic difficulties in order to safeguard employment. All in all, the 
process of decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry 
stretches back over a period of more than 30 years (Bispinck 2004a; 
Haipeter and Lehndorff 2014). The main stages were as follows. 
 
From 1984: Exchange of working time reductions for working time 
flexibility at company level 
 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry 
started in the mid-1980s with the issue of working time. In exchange for a 
reduction of weekly working time, IG Metall made some significant 
concessions regarding more working time flexibility at company level. In 
the first years of working time reduction after 1984 the agreed standard of 
weekly working time of 38.5 hours had to be achieved only as an average. 
The bargaining parties later introduced a provision that up to 18 per cent 
of employees may, on a voluntary basis, have prolonged working time of 
40 hours. In companies with a share of 50 per cent or more of high wage 
groups (engineering and developing companies) the 40-hour week may be 
applied to up to 50 per cent of employees. The same applies with regard 
to fostering innovation and countering shortages of skilled labour.  
As a consequence, the 35-hour week, which was finally achieved in the 
western German metal industry in 1995, was never fully implemented for 
all metalworkers. For parts of the workforce it serves only as a reference 
value. Since 1994 the collective agreements provide additional regulations 
according to which working time can be reduced to 30 hours per week with 
corresponding lower pay in order to safeguard jobs. This was in response 
to the sharp economic recession in 1992/1993, which threatened 
employment especially in the metal industry.  
1993: Hardship clauses in eastern Germany 
 
Opening clauses concerning pay were introduced for the first time in 
1993 in eastern Germany as a consequence of the deep transformation 
crisis that hit the metal industry in particular. After a very conflictual 
bargaining round with two weeks of strikes, IG Metall agreed to the 
introduction of a so-called hardship clause (Härtefallklausel) in the sectoral 
agreement. According to the clause, companies are allowed – under certain 
conditions – to deviate from collectively agreed pay. These deviations had 
22 THORSTEN SCHULTEN - REINHARD BISPINCK 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 137/2017 
to be negotiated not by the management and the works councils at 
establishment level but by the sectoral collective bargaining parties 
themselves. In practice, these provisions were used fairly often (Hickel and 
Kurtzke 1997). 
 
From the mid 1990s: Derogations on pay in western Germany 
 
While IG Metall rejected employers’ demands for formal adoption of 
the eastern German hardship clause also in western Germany, from the 
mid-1990s it started to accept more and more company derogations also 
in western German collective agreements. The provisions for derogation 
were often relatively vague and did not contain specific procedural rules. 
The metalworking agreement in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, had 
a provision according to which ‘in case of severe difficulties – for example, 
in order to prevent insolvency – the bargaining parties shall make efforts 
to come up with special regulations.’ 
In the metalworking industry deviations from regional sectoral 
agreements became increasingly widespread during the 1990s (Haipeter 
and Lehndorff 2009: 33ff). While in eastern Germany the existence of the 
formalised hardship clause offered a defined procedure for regulating 
deviations at company level, in western Germany regional agreements 
contained only very general ‘restructuring clauses’ with no procedural 
requirements. As a result, a ‘grey area’ of company deviations emerged 
and grew (Bahnmüller 2017). Some deviations were backed by sectoral 
agreements; others de facto contravened collectively agreed standards, 
leading to a kind of ‘wildcat cooperation’ (Streeck 1984) at company level. 
Because of lack of transparency, IG Metall had de facto lost its power to 
control decentralisation at company level, which increasingly took on a 
‘disorganized’ or ‘wild’ form. 
 
2004: Pforzheim Agreement with the introduction of a general opening 
clause 
 
The situation changed fundamentally with the adoption of the 
Pforzheim Agreement, which was concluded in the metal industry in 
February 2004. The agreement was not only the result of a conflict in 
German metalworking but also of a more fundamental societal conflict 
about the future development of the German collective bargaining system 
(Bispinck 2004b). In the early 2000s, Germany was widely regarded as 
‘the sick man of Europe’ as its economic performance was comparatively 
weak and its unemployment one of the highest in Europe. The prevailing 
opinion at that time was that the economic weakness was grounded in 
‘overregulation’ of the labour market. Thus, in 2013 the Red-Green 
government announced its notorious ‘Agenda 2010’, which contains a 
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comprehensive programme for weakening labour market regulation. As 
part of his famous ‘Agenda speech’ in the German parliament, former 
chancellor Gerhard Schröder also threatened to intervene in free collective 
bargaining through the introduction of a statutory opening clause if the 
bargaining parties themselves were not able to reach agreement on more 
possibilities for companies to derogate from sectoral agreements. The 
Pforzheim Agreement was to certain extent the price the unions had to pay 
to avoid those interventions. 
The Pforzheim Agreement contains for the first time a general opening 
clause for the whole metal industry, according to which companies can 
derogate from sectoral agreements in order to ‘secure existing employment 
and to create new jobs’ through improvement of ‘competitiveness, 
innovative capability and investment conditions’ (see Box 1). In contrast 
to earlier opening clauses, the Pforzheim Agreement says little about the 
content of possible derogations but contains mainly procedural rules. If a 
company wants to deviate from the sectoral agreement, the management 
and the works council have to make a joint application to the sector-level 
bargaining parties; that is, the regional organisations of IG Metall and 
Gesamtmetall. If the latter agree on the derogations, IG Metall negotiates 
a supplementary company agreement with the company. In principle, such 
company agreements can deal with all kind of issues, such as ‘cuts in 
special payments, deferral of claims, increasing or reducing of working 
hours with or without full wage compensation’. In practice, however, IG 
Metall usually accepted such company agreements only when the 
derogations are temporary and when the company gives a job guarantee 
for the period of derogation. 
 
 
Box 1 Pforzheim Agreement, 2004 
 
Collective agreement on competitiveness and securing of production sites for the metal and 
electrical industry, Baden-Württemberg, 25.2.2004* 
§ 1 ‘The aim of this collective agreement is to secure existing employment and to create new 
jobs in Germany. This requires improvements in competitiveness, innovative capability and 
investment conditions. The collective bargaining parties are committed to these goals and to 
their of shaping the framework for enhanced employment in Germany.  
§ 2 The parties at establishment-level examine whether measures under the existing 
provisions are exhausted to secure and promote employment. The collective bargaining 
parties advise – at the request of the parties at establishment level – what possibilities exist 
within the framework of collective agreements. If it is necessary, under consideration of the 
social and economic consequences, to secure a sustainable development of employment by 
deviating from collectively agreed regulations, the collective bargaining parties, together with 
the parties at establishment level, after joint examination, will agree on supplementary 
derogations from collectively agreed minimum standards; for example, cuts in special 
payments, deferral of claims, increasing or reducing working hours with or without full wage 
compensation (if not regulated in the collective agreement). A precondition for this is 
comprehensive information with associated documents. (…) In the overall assessment 
possible consequences on competition and employment in the sector or region, as far as 
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establishments with the same collective bargaining coverage are concerned, should be 
included.’ 
 
* Since 2008 the Pforzheim Agreement has been is part of a ‘collective agreement on the 
safeguarding and increasing of employment’ (Tarifvertrag zur Beschäftigungssicherung und 
zum Beschäfttigungsaufbau). 
 
Source: Translation by the authors. 
 
 
 
3.5 Decentralisation of metalworking collective bargaining in 
practice. 
The main impact of the Pforzheim Agreement has been the 
reorganisation – to a considerable extent – of the earlier process of wild 
decentralisation. With the definition of a general procedural framework the 
sectoral bargaining parties were able to regain control of the 
decentralisation process. For IG Metall this meant that it had to give up its 
resistance in principle to widespread use of derogations at company level 
and to accept them as an established part of a more fundamentally revised 
bargaining system in the German metal industry (Bahnmüller 2017). This 
change of viewpoint, however, does not mean that the union automatically 
accepts all applications for derogation. On the contrary, decentralisation of 
collective bargaining often goes hand in hand often with tough conflicts at 
local level (see below). 
As the Pforzheim Agreement gave both bargaining parties greater 
control over the process of decentralisation, they also have a much better 
knowledge of the scope of derogations. No coherent statistics are available, 
but from time to time both parties have published some information. 
According to data provided by Gesamtmetall, there was a steady rise in 
company-level derogations following the Pforzheim Agreement (Figure 13). 
In September 2004, only 70 cases were reported by Gesamtmetall, but by 
April 2009 the number had increased to 730. 
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Figure 13 Number of company-level derogations from sectoral agreement in metalworking 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gesamtmetall (2009). 
 
 
The key topics addressed by derogation agreements were pay and 
working time. Between 2004 and 2006, about two-thirds of all agreements 
provided for company-level deviations on these two issues (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 Issues addressed in derogation agreements in German metalworking, 2004–2006 
 
 
 
 
Source: Haipeter and Lehndorff (2009: 37). 
 
 
In exchange for employee concessions on pay and working time, 
employers have usually had to offer a quid pro quo (Figure 15). By far the 
most important issue for such ‘counter concessions’ is job protection, 
whereby the employer makes a commitment to refrain from compulsory 
economic terminations during the lifetime of the derogation agreement. In 
2006, four out of five agreements contained a provision on job security 
(Haipeter and Lehndorff 2009: 39). Other important employer concessions 
have included extensions of workers’ and unions’ codetermination rights, 
and commitments to undertake new investment and retain operations at 
existing sites. Between 2004 and 2006, a rising proportion of derogation 
agreements entailed such employer commitments in return for deviations 
from agreed terms.  
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Figure 15 Share of counter-concessions by issue in all derogation agreements in German 
metalworking, 2004–2006 
 
 
 
Source: Haipeter and Lehndorff (2009: 39). 
 
 
Only few years after the conclusion of the Pforzheim Agreement the 
global financial and economic crisis hit the German economy; the metal 
industry was most severely affected as orders and production felt 
dramatically. The unions and the works councils came under pressure to 
give support when companies got into financial difficulties. While the 
employers demanded wage restraint and other concessions, for the unions 
employment security was the top priority. In practice, companies made 
excessive use of flexible working time arrangements (running down of 
working time accounts) and short-time work (Herzog-Stein and Seifert 
2010).  
Despite a sharp cut in production the employment level in the metal 
industry remained relatively stable (Figure 16). A similar development was 
observed in other sectors. This ‘German jobs miracle’ was interpreted as 
proof of the efficiency of the built-in flexibility of the labour market 
institutions and regulations.  
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Figure 16 Production and employees in M+E industry, 2005–2015 
 
 
 
Source: Gesamtmetall (2016). 
 
 
For more recent years the latest figures published by IG Metall (2016) 
cover 2012–2014 (2). One-third of company agreements regulate 
deviations from the sectoral agreements. In addition there are so-called 
recognition agreements (Anerkennungstarifverträge) that recognise the 
sectoral agreements, partially also with some derogations. Finally, there 
are regular company agreements without any relation to sectoral 
agreements. All in all, in 2014 nearly half of all companies under the 
sectoral agreement in metalworking, with about 60 per cent of the affected 
employees, were covered by a derogation or additional company 
agreement (IG Metall 2015: 126). 
 
  
VARIETIES OF DECENTRALISATION IN GERMAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING – EXPERIENCES FROM 
METAL INDUSTRY AND RETAIL TRADE 
29 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 137/2017 
 
Table 2 Company agreements in German metalworking sector 
 
Type of agreement 2012 2013 
2014 
(1st half) 
With derogations from sectoral agreement 1,396 1,538 1,450 
% of all company collective agreements 32.9 33.9 33.6 
Recognition agreements 522 520 516 
Recognition agreements with deviations 254 248 238 
Regular company collective agreements 2,072 2,204 2,164 
Total 4,244 4,510 4,368 
 
Source: IG Metall (2014). 
 
 
The issues regulated in the more recent derogation agreements are 
again at the top: working time followed by wages, bonus regulations and 
holiday allowance. Holidays themselves were part of the derogations only 
in exceptional cases.  
The dominating concessions on the employers’ side were regulations 
concerning dismissal protection, followed to a much lower degree by 
provisions for the protection of production sites (Figure 17). The duration 
of derogation agreements ranges from one year and less up to 5 years and 
more. In the first half of 2014 about half of the agreements had a duration 
of more than two years. After expiration the derogation agreements are in 
many and prolonged or renegotiated. 
 
Opening clauses within regular pay settlements 
Apart from the introduction of a general opening clause through the 
Pforzheim Agreement it has become more and more common to introduce 
also more specific opening clauses into the regular pay settlements (Table 
3). According to these clauses companies received under certain 
circumstances the possibility to postpone regular wage increases or to 
reduce/postpone lump-sum payments. Between 2006 and 2016 opening 
clauses on pay were concluded in five of the eight bargaining rounds. 
The use of these opening clauses at company level has usually to be 
approved by IG Metal or the works council. In most cases, there were only 
a limited number of companies which demanded the use these derogations 
in practice.  
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Table 3 Opening clauses for company derogations within pay settlements, 2006–2016 
 
 
Bargaining 
round 
Provisions 
2006 One-off payment of 310 € could be reduced to 0 € or doubled to 620 
€ 
2007 Postponing of 0.7 % additional one-off payment and the second 
stage of wage increase of 1.7 % by up to 4 months possible 
2008/2009 Postponing of the second-stage increase of 2.1 % by up to 7 months 
possible, as well as reductions in the additional one-off payment of 
122 €, depending on the economic situation  
2010 Pay rise of 2.7 % could be postponed or moved forward by up to 
two months 
2012, 2013, 2015 No provisions in this regard 
2016 Postpone or eliminate the lump-sum payment of 150 € and postpone 
the second-stage pay rise of 2.0 % by up to 3 months (at the request 
of the employers’ association and based on IG Metall’s decision) 
 
Source: WSI Collective Agreement Archive. 
 
 
3.6 Outlook: Strengthening of union representation and revitalising 
sectoral collective bargaining. 
The trend towards the decentralisation of collective bargaining has 
affected the German metal industry for more than three decades. For a 
long time the unions tried to avoid or at least to limit the trend. The 
conclusion of the Pforzheim Agreement marked a turning point in the 
debate. Since then the decentralisation of collective bargaining via opening 
clauses has become the new norm in the German metal industry 
(Bahnmüller 2017). To a certain extend the Pforzheim Agreement has 
helped the bargaining parties to regain control over the decentralisation 
process. Regarding overall collective bargaining coverage in the German 
metal industry, however, it has at best helped to slow down but not to stop 
the decline. IG Metall has drawn two conclusions from this. First, it has 
tried to use the decentralisation process to strengthen its membership and 
bargaining power at company level. Secondly, it has started a broad 
campaign to reinforce sectoral bargaining and increase bargaining 
coverage. 
Concerning the use of opening clauses, IG Metall has developed a new 
bargaining strategy according to which derogations are accepted only if the 
union members within the company were actively involved in the 
negotiations and explicitly approve the results (Haipeter 2009; Haipeter 
and Lehndorff 2014; Wetzel 2014). Hereby, the union tries to use the 
company bargaining process to recruit new members and strengthen its 
organisational base in the company. Sometimes the derogation 
VARIETIES OF DECENTRALISATION IN GERMAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING – EXPERIENCES FROM 
METAL INDUSTRY AND RETAIL TRADE 
31 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 137/2017 
 
agreements even contain somewhat better conditions for union members. 
In companies in which IG Metall has no or little membership it usually 
rejects demands for negotiations on company derogations. 
More recently, IG Metall launched a broad campaign to increase 
collective bargaining coverage. Hereby, the union emphasises what its 
current president, Jörg Hofmann, calls the ‘magic triangle’ of union density 
(Mitgliederstärke), participation (Beteiligung) and collective bargaining 
coverage (Tarifbindung) (Hofmann 2016). Elements of the new strategy 
include:  
– the strengthening of bargaining coverage in the core of the value chain 
where in recent years intensive processes of outsourcing, temporary 
agency work and contract work have enlarged the ‘white spots’ on the 
bargaining landscape;  
– specific efforts in small and medium sized enterprises where bargaining 
coverage is traditionally low;  
– a campaign on contract work in order to prevent wage dumping. The 
focus here is the contract logistics sector, in which IG Metall is interested 
not only in concluding company collective agreements but also in 
pushing through for a new sector-wide collective agreement. 
In 2016 IG Metall for the first time also involved companies in the 
bargaining round that are not formally covered by collective agreements. 
In every bargaining region it systematically selected companies, at which 
it organised protest and warning strikes for the adoption of the sectoral 
collective agreement. At the end of the year the union was able to force 
145 new companies with around 36,000 employees to join the sectoral 
collective agreement in metalworking (Bier and Rio Antas 2017). In 
contrast to the unions in other sectors as, for example, in the retail trade, 
IG Metall is not demanding an extension of the sectoral agreements in 
metalworking by the state, but wants to increase bargaining coverage by 
strengthening its own organisation at workplace level. 
4. Decentralisation of collective bargaining – the 
example of German retail trade. 
4.1 Employment in the German retail trade – a sectoral profile. 
With more than 3 million employees working in around 340,000 
enterprises the retail trade is one of the largest branches in Germany 
(Handelsverband Deutschland 2016a; Glaubitz 2017). By far the largest 
sub-sector is food retailing, which represents more than 40 per cent of 
overall retail turnover (Mütze 2016). The sector is fairly polarised, with a 
few large corporations, especially among supermarkets, pharmacists, 
fashion chains and department stores, and myriad small shops and 
enterprises. In 2011, 90 per cent of all retail enterprises had fewer than 
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20 employees, while only 1 per cent had more than 100 employees 
(Dummert 2013).  
Large segments of the retail sector are fairly price sensitive, so that 
economic development in the sector is shaped by strong price competition. 
Against the background of an ongoing extension of shop opening hours, as 
well as continuously growing sales floor size, fierce competition has 
become more and more the dominant economic pattern in the sector 
(Glaubitz 2017). In recent years, the competitive pressure has been further 
intensified by the rapid growth of e-commerce (Handelsverband 2016b: 
12). The fierce price competition has also become a major influence on 
employment conditions and labour relations in the sector, as labour costs 
are the second most important cost factor, after goods. 
Turning to employment structure, the retail trade is first of all a 
female-dominated sector; around 70 per cent of all retail trade workers are 
women (Figure 18). Furthermore, there is a very high proportion of part-
time (35 per cent) and marginal part-time workers (27 per cent). In 
Germany, the latter are also called ‘mini-jobbers’, with a special 
employment status according to which they are allowed to earn up to 450 
euros a month at reduced tax and social security conditions. Finally, only 
a minority of 38 per cent of all retail workers are still hired on a full-time 
basis (Figure 18).  
 
 
 
Figure 18 Structure of employment in the German retail trade, September 2016 (% of all 
retail trade workers) 
  
 
  
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), Authors’ calculations. 
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During the 2000s employment in the retail trade saw a significant shift 
from full-time to part-time work (Figure 19). Between 2000 and 2010 the 
number of full-time workers decreased by almost 20 per cent, while the 
number of part-time employees increased by around 8 per cent. Since 
2010 the number of both full- and part-time workers has showed a steady 
increase, part-time work growing much faster than full-time. All in all, the 
retail trade has one of the highest proportions of (mainly female) part-time 
work in Germany.  
 
Figure 19 Full- and part-time workers in the German retail trade, 2000–2016 (2000 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: German Statistical Office, GENESIS-Online Database (www-genesis.destatis.de),  
Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
The retail sector has a relatively high incidence of different types of 
precarious employment (Bundesregierung 2016, 2017; Glaubitz 2017). 
First of all, there is an extraordinarily high proportion of marginal part-time 
employment, which in many cases has replaced regular full-time or part-
time jobs (Hohendanner and Stegmaier 2012). There are two main reasons 
for the widespread use of mini-jobbers: (i) it allows companies to save 
labour costs, as they only have to pay reduced social security 
contributions; moreover, marginal part-time workers are often ready to 
accept lower wages, as they do not have to pay tax for such employment. 
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(ii) marginal part-time work gives employers much working time flexibility, 
which has become particularly important due to the extension of shop-
opening hours. As a result, many mini-jobbers work in the evening or 
during the weekend or are even hired on an ‘on-demand’ basis (Fischer et 
al. 2015: 218). 
A second type of precarious employment, which is being used more 
and more in the retail trade sector, is fixed-term employment. In recent 
years, the latter has become particularly widespread among newly hired 
employees (Table 4). In 2015, almost half of all newly hired workers in 
retail received only a fixed-term contract. This holds true for both female 
and male workers, which show no differences in this respect. In the same 
year, only 45 per cent of workers with a fixed-term contract were 
transferred to a permanent employment relationship (Bundesregierung 
2017: 5).  
 
 
Table 4 Proportion of newly hired workers in the German retail trade with a fixed-term contract 
(%) 
 
Year All Women Men 
2010 38 39 37 
2011 40 42 34 
2012 41 44 36 
2013 45 45 46 
2014 49 51 46 
2015 49 50 48 
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, quoted from Bundesregierung (2017: 4). 
 
 
4.2 Trade unions and employers’ associations in the German retail 
trade. 
The two main collective actors in the retail trade are the German Retail 
Federation (Handelverband Deutschland, HDE) and the United Services 
Union (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di). The HDE is the peak 
business organisation in the German retail trade sector, with various 
regional and professional trade associations, and represents about 100,000 
enterprises.4 The latter correspond to around 30 per cent of all retail 
enterprises. However, as most of the larger retail corporations are 
members of the HDE, the organisation represents a much higher share of 
the sector. The HDE is both a business organisation, which does political 
lobbying for the economic interests of the sector, and an employers’ 
association which is involved in collective bargaining. 
                                                             
4 Figures from the HDE Homepage: https://www.einzelhandel.de/  
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By far the most important trade union in the retail trade sector is 
Ver.di, which is the second largest trade union in Germany and affiliated 
with the Confederation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB).5 Ver.di represents, apart from the public 
sector, about 200 industries in private services and has about 2 million 
members (Dribbusch et al. 2017: 202). The union has a separate division 
for the whole commerce sector and a sub-division for the retail trade. In 
2013 ver.di had about 264,000 members in the retail trade which 
corresponds to a union density of less than 10 per cent (Franke 2013). 
While union density is often somewhat higher in larger retail corporations, 
the union is almost absent from many of the small and medium-sized 
companies. The same holds true for the existence of a works council, which 
is often an important body for recruiting new union members. In the 
commerce sector overall only 9 per cent of establishments and 28 per cent 
of employees are covered by a works council (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017: 
283). The relatively weak position of ver.di in the retail trade is partly also 
a result of the growing number of precarious retail workers, who are much 
more difficult to organise. 
4.3 Collective bargaining in the German retail trade – structure and 
trends. 
At first glance the industrial relations regime in the retail trade seems 
to follow the traditional German model, with multi-employer collective 
bargaining at sectoral level. In comparison with manufacturing, however, 
industrial relations in the retail trade have become much more diversified 
and fragmented due to the specific economic structure and the dominant 
pattern of economic development and employment in the sector (Kalkowski 
2008; Beile and Priessner 2011; Glaubitz 2017). 
Collective bargaining in the German retail trade takes place at sectoral 
level; sectoral agreements are concluded for different regions. Currently, 
there are 14 regional bargaining units, which largely corresponds to the 16 
German federal states (Bundesländer). The only exceptions are the federal 
states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, which form a joint regional 
bargaining unit. Negotiations are held between the regional divisions of 
ver.di and the HDE, which are autonomous in concluding collective 
agreements at regional level. In practice, however, both organisations aim 
to coordinate their demands and negotiations at national level. If one 
region concludes a pilot agreement, the other regions usually follow with 
the same or similar agreements.  
                                                             
5 There is a second small trade union, the DHV- Die Berufsgewerkschaft e.V., which has some 
influence in a few retail companies, but is only of minor importance in the sector as a whole. 
The DHV is affiliated to the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Christlicher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, CGB). 
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Traditionally, collective agreements in the retail trade were always 
declared universally binding so that they cover not only the bargaining 
parties but all enterprises in the sector. The practice of extension, which 
for a long time was supported by both the trade unions and the employers’ 
associations, started in the mid-1950s and was carried on until the early 
2000s. There was a joint belief among the bargaining parties that extension 
was necessary in order to create fair competition in the retail trade and to 
prevent downward pressure on wages and working conditions.  
During the 1990s there was a growing dissatisfaction with the 
collective bargaining system among some retail companies, which left the 
main employers’ association or became members of competing 
organisations. In order to keep their members, in 1999 the main 
employers’ associations started to introduce a new membership status, 
according to which member companies were no longer automatically bound 
by the sectoral collective agreements signed by the association (Behrens 
2011: 174ff.). With the so-called ‘OT’ membership status (OT = ohne 
Tarifbindung, which means ‘not bound by a collective agreement’) the HDE 
established an organisational logic which was in fundamental contradiction 
to the principle of sector-wide extension of collective agreements. Thus, 
from the year 2000 onwards, the employers’ associations refused to accept 
the practice of extension so that retail agreements were no longer generally 
binding. 
As a result of the rejection of extensions, since the year 2000 collective 
bargaining coverage in the retail trade has declined dramatically 
(Felbermayr and Lehwald 2015). In 2010, only half of the employees and 
one-third of the establishments were still covered by a collective 
agreement. Between 2010 and 2016 collective bargaining coverage 
declined even further, down to only 39 per cent of workers and 27 per cent 
of enterprises (Figure 20). While before 2000 the extensions had ensured 
that the entire sector was covered by collective agreements, now only a 
minority are still involved in collective bargaining. 
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Figure 20 Collective bargaining coverage in the German retail trade, 2010–2016 (% of 
establishments and employees) 
 
 
 
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
 
In 2016, the sectoral collective agreement in the retail trade covered 
only 34 per cent of the employees and 24 per cent of the establishments. 
In addition, 5 per cent of the employees and 3 per cent of the 
establishments had a company agreement, while a large majority – 58 per 
cent of the employees and 73 per cent of the establishments – were not 
covered by any collective agreement (Figure 4).6 
Among the latter a significant number of companies declare that they 
take the existing sectoral agreements as ‘orientation’. In practice, 
however, this does not mean that they provide the same conditions as laid 
down in the collective agreements. According to studies by Addison et al. 
(2016) and Berwing (2016) companies that argue that collective 
agreements are taken as orientation, nevertheless often have much lower 
wages and working conditions than companies directly covered by the 
agreements. 
 
 
                                                             
6 According to data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey overall bargaining coverage 
in the retail trade is only 28 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt (2016a). For a discussion of 
the different data sources see footnote 1. 
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Figure 21 Collective bargaining coverage in the German retail trade, 2016 (% of 
establishments and employees) 
 
 
Establishments    Employees 
 
  
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
 
In Germany, there is usually a strong correlation between size of 
company and bargaining coverage. Smaller companies are less likely to be 
covered by collective agreements, while it is rather rare that larger 
corporations are not covered (Ellgut and Kohaut 2017). In the retail trade 
the picture is somewhat more differentiated. On one hand, it confirms the 
general trend as the majority of small and medium-sized companies have 
no collective agreement. In addition, however, a significant number of 
large retail corporations have decided to withdraw from collective 
bargaining (Glaubitz 2017). Among them are some big players in e-
commerce, such as Amazon or Zalando, in which ver.di has not been able 
to reach an agreement so far (Boewe and Schulten 2017). Other large 
companies, such as the warehouse chain Karstadt or the fashion store 
Esprit, also withdrew from collective agreements, but came back into the 
fold after a long struggle with the union. In contrast to that, C&A – the 
largest fashion chain in Germany – continues to reject demands for a 
collective agreement. 
Finally, even significant parts of food stores and supermarkets have no 
collective bargaining. Although the two largest food chains EDEKA and 
REWE are formally covered by the retail trade agreements, most 
supermarkets that run under their brand names belong to formally 
independent merchants many of whom refuse to accept collective 
agreements (Verheyen and Schillig 2017). 
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4.4 Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the German retail 
trade7. 
As in other sectors, the debates and conflicts about stronger 
decentralisation and differentiation of collective bargaining started in the 
retail trade in the 1990s. Within Ver.di, as well as in its predecessor in the 
retail trade, the Union for Commerce, Banking and Insurance 
(Gewerkschaft Handel Banken Versicherungen, HBV),8 the issue of 
decentralisation has always been very much contested. In general, the 
union has been more reluctant to accept employers’ demands for opening 
clauses or other forms of decentralisation in order to derogate from 
standards laid down in the sectoral collective agreements at company level. 
The rational for the union’s scepticism is grounded chiefly in two 
considerations. First, the union emphasised that working conditions and, 
especially, pay were at a much lower level than in, for example, 
manufacturing, so that further cuts would not be acceptable. Secondly, it 
was afraid that decentralisation would further weaken the position of the 
workers considering the relatively low union density and low level of works 
council representation in the retail trade. 
Despite the union’s scepticism, some first attempts towards an 
‘organised decentralisation’ of collective bargaining in the retail trade date 
back to the 1990s (Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv 1999). Most of them, 
however, were limited to eastern Germany, where after unification the 
economy got into great difficulties, with unemployment rates often twice 
as high as in western Germany. 
From the second half of the 1990s onwards one major instrument for 
differentiation was the introduction of a special clause for small and 
medium-sized companies (the so-called Mittelstandsklausel) which still 
exists in all eastern German retail agreements. According to this clause, 
retail companies up to a certain size are allowed to provide a basic payment 
which is below the standard level agreed in the sectoral agreements. The 
retail pay agreement from 2015 for the Federal State of Brandenburg, for 
example, allows firms to reduce basic payments by 4 per cent in companies 
of up to 25 employees, by 6 per cent in companies of up to 15 employees 
and by 8 per cent in companies of up to 5 employees. All other eastern 
German agreements contain the same or similar provisions, but not those 
in western Germany, where they were never introduced.  
Almost all regional retail agreements in both eastern and western 
Germany have some opening clauses on working time. While the regular 
collectively agreed working time varies between 37 and 39 hours per week 
(Bundesregierung 2017: 7), most regional agreements allow the extension 
                                                             
7 This section is based on an evaluation of original collective agreements in the retail trade 
provided by the WSI Collective Agreements Archive. 
8 Ver.di was created in 2001 as a result of a merger of five trade unions, one of which was 
the HBV. 
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of regular weekly working time up to 40 hours (or even 42 hours for special 
professions) at company level. The company has to compensate for basic 
pay, but does not have to pay overtime. Usually, the working time 
extension needs to be concluded in a works agreement between the works 
council and the management. Some regional agreements also allow for 
working time extension on an individual basis when there is no works 
council in the company. 
After the conclusion of the famous Pforzheim Agreement in 2004, 
which includes a broad framework for company-level derogations in the 
German metal industry, there was general pressure on the unions in other 
sectors to accept similar agreements. In 2006 most regional bargaining 
units in the retail trade concluded so-called ‘collective agreements to 
safeguard employment’ (Tarifverträge zur Beschäftigungssicherung), 
which under certain circumstances allow temporary derogations from the 
sectoral collective agreements at company level. In order to avoid a difficult 
economic situation which might lead to job losses these agreements allow 
the works council and the management at company level to make a joint 
demand for such derogations. In this case, the parties at sectoral level – 
the union and the employers’ associations – are obliged to negotiate about 
possible derogations, while the companies need to open their books in 
order to prove the state of their economic circumstances. If an agreement 
could be reached the unions and the company finally sign an additional 
company-level collective agreement which determines temporary 
derogations.  
Similar to the Pforzheim Agreement the Agreements to safeguard 
employment in the retail trade only regulate the procedure for derogations, 
but say nothing about its concrete content where the bargaining parties 
are almost free to negotiate all kind of issues regarding pay, working time 
and annual bonuses. In practice, however, they usually follow the pattern 
of traditional concession bargaining, in which the union agrees on a 
reduction of labour costs in exchange for a certain job security. Before the 
union is allowed to sign such an agreement, however, it also has to follow 
its internal coordination procedures. Within Ver.di there is an internal rule 
that all collective agreements on derogations need to be approved by the 
unions’ national collective bargaining department (Wiedemuth 2006).  
In practice, the use of opening clauses and other forms of organised 
decentralisation is much less common in the retail trade than in other 
sectors (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016: 217). In contrast, the dominant form 
of decentralisation in the sector is still a more ‘disorganised’ 
decentralisation, where companies simply withdraw from the collective 
agreement. Attempts to achieve more organised forms of decentralisation 
were not able to stop the general trend toward a decline in collective 
bargaining. For a majority of the enterprises in the retail sector, however, 
it currently seems to be more attractive to abstain from collective 
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bargaining, while the union often lacks the power to force these companies 
to the bargaining table.  
Only in a few cases – in some larger retail companies – were the unions 
able to conclude so-called ‘phase-in agreements’ (Heranführungs- oder 
Anerkennungstarifverträge) where the company agreed to improve its 
conditions towards the sector-wide standards within a transition period and 
after that be fully covered by the sectoral agreement. Current examples 
are the fashion stores Esprit and Primark and the supermarket chain Real.  
In the case of the large warehouse form Karstadt, which withdrew from 
collective bargaining in 2013 after getting into serious economic difficulties, 
a new company agreement was signed in 2017, according to which the 
company will again be covered by the sectoral collective agreements in the 
retail trade. However, for the next four years wage increases will not follow 
the sectoral agreements but will be related to company performance. In 
exchange, the company has guaranteed all current jobs and warehouses 
during the same period (ver.di 2017).  
4.5 Impact of the erosion of collective bargaining in the German 
retail trade.  
The erosion of collective bargaining in the German retail trade has had 
an enormous impact on the working conditions and especially the wages of 
the affected workers. According to a study by Felbermayr and Lehwald 
(2015) workers covered by collective agreements earn, on average, 
between 20 and 30 per cent more than workers who are not covered. The 
average wage gap is particularly high among cashiers (30 per cent), 
followed by buyers (26 per cent), salespersons (25 per cent) and receiving 
clerks (21 per cent) (Figure 22). It is also much higher in small and 
medium-sized companies than in larger corporations (ibid: 39). Apart from 
pay, there are often significant differences regarding other working 
conditions, such as working time and annual bonuses, which further 
deepens the collective bargaining gap. 
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Figure 22 Average wage gap between retail workers covered and not covered by collective 
agreements, 2010 (%) 
 
 
 
Source: Felbermayr and Lehwald (2015: 39). 
 
 
The decline of collective bargaining in the retail trade has also 
contributed to the fact that wages in the retail trade have lagged 
significantly behind overall wage developments. Between 2001 and 2016 
collectively agreed wages in the retail trade grew by about 37 per cent in 
comparison with 44.8 per cent in the economy as a whole and 51.9 per 
cent in the metal industry (Figure 23).  
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Figure 23 Collectively agreed wages in the German retail trade, metal industry and total 
economy, 2001–2016 (2000 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: WSI Collective Agreement Archive. 
 
 
All in all, wage levels in the retail trade are significantly below wage 
levels in manufacturing, but also below the average wage level in the 
economy as a whole (Figure 24). The wage gap is particularly pronounced 
in companies covered by collective agreements, which underlines the 
weakness of collective bargaining in the retail sector. Concerning gross 
monthly median wages in companies with collective agreements, wage 
levels in the commerce sector as a whole (that is, retail trade plus 
wholesale trade and garages) are on average 23 per cent below the level 
in manufacturing and 11 per cent below the level in the economy as a 
whole. In companies without collective agreements the respective wage 
gaps are 12 and 5 per cent. 
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Figure 24 Gross monthly median wages in German commerce* manufacturing and total 
economy, 2014 
(full-time workers, euros) 
 
 
 
Note: * Commerce = Retail trade, wholesale trade and garages. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016b), German Structure of Earnings Survey 2014.  
 
 
The retail sector also has a relatively large proportion of low-wage 
earners (Bundesregierung 2016: 16; 2017: 98f.). In 2014, about 22 per 
cent of all retail workers earned less than 8.50 euros per hour, so that they 
benefited considerably from the introduction of a national statutory 
minimum wage in January 2015 (Mindestlohnkommission 2016: 43). 
4.6 Outlook: Collective bargaining in the retail trade at a 
crossroads: further erosion or stabilisation? 
Developments in the retail trade constitute an extreme example of the 
general decline in German collective bargaining. After the retail employers’ 
associations started to reject the long-standing practice of extension of 
collective agreements in 2000, collective bargaining coverage dropped 
sharply, so that currently only a minority – about 40 per cent – of retail 
trade workers are still covered. The erosion of collective bargaining has 
largely contributed to a significant change in economic development in the 
sector, which is now dominated by fierce competition. As collective 
bargaining is no longer able to take wages and working conditions out of 
competition by setting sector-wide minimum standards, there is strong 
pressure on labour costs, which has led to a deterioration of working 
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conditions and an increase in precarious employment. All this gives 
companies a strong incentive to withdraw from collective agreements.  
Therefore, collective bargaining in the retail trade is now at a 
crossroads. If the erosion continues, bargaining coverage may fall below 
the critical mass needed for sector-wide agreements. The result, sooner or 
later, would be a complete breakdown of sectoral bargaining, so that 
collective bargaining would remain only at company level in (mainly) larger 
retail corporations. 
The alternative would be a re-stabilisation of collective bargaining in 
the sector. One approach to this end might be to strengthen the more 
organised forms of decentralisation in order to give companies more 
flexibility within collective agreements. Since the mid-2000s the retail 
sector has also had its ‘Pforzheim agreements’, with far-reaching 
possibilities for derogations at company level. The establishment of more 
organised decentralisation, however, was not able to stop the general 
decline in collective bargaining.  
Another approach would be the reintroduction of collective agreement 
extension in the retail sector so that agreed minimum standards could 
become generally binding. The trade union ver.di is currently campaigning 
for this, which is now seen as the key to restabilising the collective 
bargaining system in the retail trade (Nutzenberger 2017).9 The employers’ 
association HDE, however, has so far rejected the demand for a 
reintroduction of extension and has claimed that it has ‘no acceptance’ 
among its members. The HDE criticised, in particular, what it characterises 
as the ‘old-fashioned’ wage systems in the sectoral agreements, which the 
employers’ association regards as a major obstacle to increasing 
bargaining coverage in the sector (HDE 2017).10  
Moreover, the HDE is opposed to the extension of collective 
agreements in principle as this would call into question its OT status. 
However, some HDE member companies take a different view. The head 
of the Schwarz Corporation, for example, which represents, among others, 
the second largest German discount chain, Lidl, has openly called for the 
retail sectoral agreements to be declared generally binding, so that all 
companies are competing on a level playing field (Stockburger 2017). 
The coming years will show whether the erosion of collective 
bargaining in the retail trade will continue or whether the bargaining parties 
will be able to restabilise the system. With regard to the latter, it is 
becoming obvious that a strategy directed towards organised 
decentralisation is not sufficient as it is much easier for companies to 
withdraw from collective bargaining than to follow a regulated derogation 
                                                             
9 For more information on the ver.di campaign for the extension of collective agreements in 
the retail trade: https://handel.verdi.de/themen/tarifpolitik/ave-kampagne  
10 Negotiations on a ‘modernisation’ of the wage systems in retail trade have taken place since 
the 2000s (Kalkowski 2008).  
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process. For the moment, the reintroduction of extension might be the only 
instrument able to stop further erosion and to stabilise the bargaining 
system. The latter, however, needs much broader acceptance among retail 
employers, which it will probably obtain only with ‘modernisation’ of 
collectively agreed wage structures in accordance with employer 
preferences.  
5. Conclusion. 
The trend towards decentralisation has fundamentally changed the 
German system of collective bargaining. It comprises various 
developments in different sectors and companies, making the overall 
picture fairly diverse. On one hand, there are sectors in which the 
bargaining parties have established new forms of organised 
decentralisation. Here, sectoral bargaining is still dominant and the 
derogations are under the control of bargaining parties at sectoral level. 
The metal industry and even more the chemical industry are the most 
prominent examples of this. The chemical industry may come closest to 
the ideal type of organised decentralisation: the use of opening clauses is 
fairly limited and has clearly helped to stabilise collective bargaining in the 
sector.  
Experiences in the metal industry, however, are much more 
ambiguous. On one hand, the collective bargaining parties were to a certain 
extent able to regain control over the decentralisation process, as the 
Pforzheim Agreement established new binding coordination procedures. On 
the other hand the decline of bargaining coverage in metalworking 
continued, while derogations at company level became so widespread that 
sectoral agreements often determine only a framework but not actual pay 
and conditions. 
Finally, the retail trade sector is an example of the dominance of 
unorganised decentralisation. After the employers had withdrawn from the 
regulated system of extended collective agreements, bargaining coverage 
declined dramatically. Today, only a minority of retail workers are still 
covered by a collective agreement. Although the sector has created all the 
instruments needed for a more organised form of decentralisation, they 
are rarely used in practice.  
The different paths towards decentralisation in Germany reflect the 
different economic conditions, the different structures of companies and 
employment and – not at least – the different power relations in the various 
sectors. The majority of German workers are experiencing decentralisation 
as a further weakening of their position. As Nienhüser and Hoßfeld (2008, 
2010) have shown, there are wide differences in how the trend towards 
collective bargaining decentralisation is perceived by the actors at company 
level (Table 5). The large majority of managers take a fairly positive view, 
as, from their standpoint, decentralisation strengthens the position of both 
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management and works councils, takes better account of the business 
situation and weakens the power of the union at workplace level. In 
contrast, the majority of works councillors are much more sceptical. For 
them, the main winners of bargaining decentralisation are management; 
only a minority of works councillors believe that this process strengthens 
their own position. Only 32 per cent of employee representatives consider 
that decentralisation could help to secure jobs, as against 82 per cent of 
managers. A large majority of 78 per cent of works councillors, but also 40 
per cent of managers, believe that the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining leads to more conflicts at company level. 
 
 
Table 5 Decentralisation of collective bargaining as seen by managers and works councillors 
(%) 
 
Deviations from sectoral 
agreements  
Managers Works councillors 
strengthen the influence and power of 
the management 
95 91 
strengthen the influence and power of 
the works council 
89 43 
take into account better the situation of 
the establishment 
93 51 
can help to secure jobs 82 32 
lead to lower wages 33 79 
take up unnecessary time and 
resources 
33 67 
lead to more conflicts 40 78 
overburden the management 14 39 
overburden the works council 42 64 
strengthen the power of the unions at 
the establishment 
21 13 
weaken the power of the unions at the 
establishment 
69 83 
 
Source: Nienhüser and Hoßfeld (2010). 
 
 
The sceptical or even negative view of the employees has also been 
confirmed by data from the WSI Works Council Survey (Figure 25). Since 
the late 1990s a stable majority of works council members have seen 
bargaining decentralisation as ‘ambiguous’ or ‘generally problematic’, while 
only 12–15 per cent welcome this trend. Again, decentralisation is seen by 
a large majority of employee representatives as a process that mainly 
strengthens the employers’ bargaining. According to the survey, conducted 
in 2015, 33 per cent of works councillors see decentralisation as 
‘ambiguous’, while 44 per cent view it as generally problematic. Quite often 
works councillors have felt ’blackmailed’ by their companies to accept 
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concessions, and, as they could no longer refer to binding standards at 
sectoral level, have lost an important instrument of resistance.  
 
 
Figure 25 View of the works councillors on the decentralisation of collective bargaining  
Decentralisation of collective bargaining is regarded as … 
 
 
 
 
WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016). 
 
 
Three decades of experience with collectively agreed opening clauses 
have changed the basic structure of collective bargaining in Germany. The 
widespread introduction of these clauses triggered a process of 
decentralisation that has shifted an increasingly large part of bargaining 
responsibilities to company level. This has led to a significant loss of 
regulatory power on the part of both employers’ associations and trade 
unions. Collectively agreed standards, once seen as formally inviolable 
norms, have now become objects of renegotiation at company level, with 
varying degrees of involvement on the part of the signatories of sectoral 
agreements. As a consequence, unions must now engage much more 
directly with the needs and requirements of companies, and works councils 
have less scope to take refuge in the mandatory character of sectoral 
regulations when confronted by management calls for local concessions. 
This requires more coordinating efforts from the unions in order to avoid 
the erosion of standards in individual sectors. The functional differentiation 
between unions and works councils, which has been fundamental to the 
German dual system of interest representation, has become increasingly 
blurred. 
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Despite the hazards and side-effects of decentralisation, trade unions 
have sought to use the process as a starting point to build organisational 
power at workplace level through greater involvement of rank-and-file 
members in the process of renegotiation. Research shows that there are 
positive results in some cases, but little evidence that this strategy has 
been realised across-the-board (Haipeter 2009; Haipeter and Lehndorff 
2014; Bahnmüller 2017).  
Moreover, only about 9 per cent of all establishments, with around 41 
per cent of all employees, currently have a works council (Ellguth and 
Kohaut 2017: 283). There is an important ‘representation gap’, in 
particular in small and medium-sized firms, depriving unions of a vital 
prerequisite for a proactive workplace strategy. Without adequate 
employee representation at the workplace and company level, however, 
there is a clear danger that the decentralisation of collective bargaining will 
de facto strengthen unilateral decision-making by management. 
Finally, the decentralisation process has increasingly undermined the 
effectiveness of sectoral collective agreements and their basic function: 
namely, to take wages and other working conditions out of competition. At 
the same time, it is questionable whether decentralisation has stabilised 
the German bargaining system. While this might be the case in some 
sectors, overall there is a parallel trend of decentralisation and further 
decline of bargaining coverage. Therefore, the current debate in Germany 
on strengthening collective bargaining is not about decentralisation but 
about strengthening union power, on one hand, and increasing the political 
support for the bargaining system (for example, through more extensions), 
on the other. 
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